THE government’s policy on Iraq has never been a transient creed. There has been, even prior to the invasion of 2003, a stated aim: to turn Iraq, post-Saddam, into a pro-West democratic state. Its objective, emanating from the White House in Washington, and against the advice from the Arabic experts inside the Foreign Office, was to create a model state inside the Middle East that would act as the template for others. Iraq was to be the first of many.

However, this goal and the reality in the Middle East has never found much overlap. This British policy objective has become mired in a shared zeal that finds its origins in the neoconservative ambitions of George W Bush’s now failing administration. Yet even in the face of a harsh reality that says Iraq is never going to be re-fashioned in Washington’s image and likeness, Tony Blair finds it difficult to come to terms with a foreign policy that has failure stamped all over it.

He told his party’s conference in Manchester that there could be no retreat, that surrender in Iraq would put our future security in the deepest peril. And he promised that our troops would not be fighting in vain.

As usual with much of Blair’s rhetoric, there is a massive credibility gap between a stated aim and what has been done to deliver it. In three-and-a-half years of fighting in Iraq, there is precious little that points to hope, prosperity and stability for the post-Saddam state. And it is this harsh and violent political reality that made the comments of General Sir Richard Dannatt all the more powerful when he said last week that British troops should leave Iraq “soon” because their presence there was only making the crisis worse.

Blair’s attempt to claim that Dannatt was saying nothing new and that he agreed with all he said, is faintly preposterous. Dannatt talked of the possibility of a “broken” army if British forces were still in Iraq in five or 10 years’ time. Blair has never bothered with such a scenario, nor accepted the premise that coalition forces were doing more harm than good. Had he done so in Manchester before his party, it would have created chaos in Washington with Blair accused of abandoning Bush in the dying days of his premiership.

He never said it because he knows Washington don’t want to hear it. But Dannatt has no such reservations. As chief of the general staff, he has both military and political skills. He would not have reached the position he has without an ability to manage both successfully. And he will have fully appreciated the impact of his words. Did he cross a political line, a line where a general should not have strayed? The answer to that is an unqualified yes. But Dannatt crossed the line in unusual circumstances. With responsibility for the tens of thousands of British troops who are serving or who will serve in Iraq, Dannatt has effectively refused to play the “emperor’s new clothes” game and blown the lid off Blair’s failing foreign policy in Iraq. He has exposed the lack of any firm objective in Iraq, a lack of any strategy that could lead to eventual troop withdrawal. In doing this he has said no more than other senior military advisers have said to government.

So while we are uneasy at a general marching into political territory, we believe Dannatt had a duty to say what he did when he did. To remain silent and to continue overseeing the Iraq mission as it drifted, year on year, amid endless promises of leaving “when the job is done” without ever defining what precisely the job was, would have been inconceivable to a decorated soldier like Dannatt.

SO having exposed the vacuum in Britain’s objectives in Iraq, we have to ensure that the debate Dannatt’s intervention has kick-started is not wasted. Politicians on both sides of this debate should accept that staying in Iraq on the conditions that currently exist is not tenable. Iraqi-isation, the phrase that is supposed to describe the state of Iraq’s police and armed forces being grown to take over the security role currently being filled by coalition forces, is a fantasy in many areas. The US has no intention of ever fully arming the Iraq military. Their generals continue to believe the weapons would eventually be used against them in the future. The numerous Iraqi police forces have also been infiltrated by the militia groups that have grown as the insurgency gained strength. An unconditional pull-out now would also leave a hideous vacuum certain to be filled with civil war and a bloodbath. And blame for the destruction and a failed state would lie with Washington and London. That leaves only one course of action, however difficult it will be to implement. Britain has to begin devising a strategic and timetabled withdrawal. It would give the fledgling Iraqi government time to look ahead and plan for the responsibilities it will hold. Such a strategy guarantees nothing, and doesn’t guarantee a peaceful transition to full Iraqi control. But a start should now be made on the mechanisms of withdrawal.

So far, all policy in Iraq has been US-led, with Blair playing a subservient role. Next month, if Bush loses control of Congress in the US mid-term elections, the way a future US administration treats Iraq could quickly change. Rather than again following behind the White House, Britain should now attempt to set the coalition withdrawal agenda and look ahead to the day when Iraqis are back in control of their own affairs, however imperfect that state will be.